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The sense of privilege that I feel in being invited to deliver this lecture is 
tempered by my sadness that the distinguished lawyer, in whose honour it was 
founded, is no longer with us.  
David was a friend of, and mentor to, me for many years.  We first met in 
the 1960s when he was a Law Fellow at Keble, Oxford – a part of his career 
which was mysteriously airbrushed from the Memorial Service which took 
place earlier this year in Great St Mary’s Church.  He became an academic 
tenant in the chambers at 4/5 Grays Inn Square of which I was then joint head.  
He acted, as he put it, as my “junior” when I chaired the Judicial 
Subcommittee of the Senior Salaries Review Body:  We were clearly 
suspected in tandem of apparent, if not actual, bias towards the payees, since 
at the conclusion of our term no lawyers appointed were to replace us.  He 
was one of my referees when I became President of the smaller – I choose the 
adjective with care – of the two Oxbridge Trinities.  It was characteristic of 
David, whose modesty was preeminent among his many memorable qualities, 
that in asking me to be the tenth lecturer in this series, he told me only after I 
had accepted, that he was in all likelihood destined not to be among the 
audience.  Alas, his prophecy was fulfilled.  I miss him greatly.   
My predecessors as lecturer have all been lawyers of the highest repute – 
the last four being Chief Justices of major democracies.  Indeed for me to 
follow in the immediate footsteps of the Chief Justice of the United States of 
America, albeit a stripling some years younger than I, risks giving a new 
meaning to the word ‘bathos’.  But incapable of matching these generals in 
                                                     
1 Blackstone Chambers, the Temple, sometime President of Trinity College and 
Treasurer of Gray’s Inn, Senior Ordinary Appeal Judge of Jersey and Guernsey,  
Judge of the First Tier of the Upper Tribunal. 
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delivering ex cathedra statements from the mountain peaks of the law, I, a 
mere foot soldier, have decided to pitch my perspective from its plains.   
I have been for more than four decades a member of the Bar of England 
and Wales so crossing what my researches for this lecture identify as a 
chronological plimsoll line. In the Bodleian Law Library I came across two 
memoirs entitled “Forty Years at the Bar” one by Edward Abinger,2 the other 
by James Balfour-Bowen3 only to find, a few shelves on, a volume entitled 
“72 years at the Bar” by Ernest Bowen-Rowlands4 – a quantum leap of 
forensic longevity, equivalent in terms of record breaking to Usain Bolt’s 
exploits as a sprinter. Abinger’s plea in mitigation for his autobiography 
rested on the coincidence that, as he wrote, he had “nearly attained the three 
score years and ten usually allotted to men” coupled with the urgings of his 
many friends5. I could only avail myself of half of that not altogether 
convincing excuse.  And it is not my purpose, in mimicry of these worthies, 
merely to indulge in titivated court room reminiscence, nor to give an 
apologia pro vita mea, although my lecture will be in part a credo. At the end 
of that classic sixties film Alfie, the hero played by Michael Caine, turns 
towards the camera, and asks ‘‘What’s it all about?’’ It is that question, as a 
veteran6 jobbing attorney, that I shall seek to answer. 
But let me start my voyage in that now iconic decade. 
I was called to the Bar by Grays Inn in November 1967. In order to 
qualify, aspirant barristers who did not need to be graduates, could study law 
in their own time, from nutshell notes, scripted by Gibson and Weldon. My 
practical training consisted of watching my pupil-master, to whom I was 
apprenticed for the next year, and learning from his trials and his errors in 
equal measure. For this facility I had to pay him the princely sum of £50. 
In those days barristers still conventionally wore cutaway black jackets 
and striped trousers; and a handful continued to affect bowler hats. There 
were few females in the profession – in the year of my Call approximately 7% 
of new barristers. Objections were still voiced, devoid of any sense of shame, 
to women being admitted to chambers on the basis that they would inevitably 
soon depart to pursue their proper and predestined role of child bearing and 
rearing. 
                                                     
2 (Hutchinson, 1930). 
3 (Herbert Jenkins, 1971). 
4 (Macmillan, 1924). I passed over J Law My Sixty Years in the Law (Bodley Head, 
1936) - the recollections of a Judge’s clerk.  
5 Ibid, p 7. 
6 So described in the Gibraltar Chronicle when appearing in the Privy Council for the 
Chief Justice in Hearing on the Report of the Chief Justice of Gibralter Referrals 
under section 4 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833 [2009] UKPC43, the day before I 
was identified on the same journal as “imminent” (sic). 
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Ethnic minority counsel were still rarer. While the Inns of Court played 
host to a significant proportion of overseas students from new Commonwealth 
and old Empire, those same students were expected to return to their own 
countries and exploit the title of barrister-at-law to immediate advantage, 
accelerating to positions such as Attorney General or even Chief Justice with 
a velocity which their English equivalents could only emulate in their dreams.  
Chambers were generally small – my own set, 2 Hare Court, had, when I 
arrived, 12 members and no QCs. Chambers’ names were then their addresses 
too. Membership was for life. Departure from the set to which one had been 
admitted as a tenant, indeed as a pupil, on the solitary say-so of the Head of 
Chambers, himself selected on the principle of Buggin’s turn, was as rare, and 
as disagreeable, as divorce.   
Chambers’ administration rested exclusively on the clerks, who arranged 
one’s diary, negotiated one’s fees, and took 10% of them – the so-called 
shilling in the guinea. 
Control of the profession still rested substantially with the Inns: the Bar 
Council being more a representative than a regulatory body and its Chairman, 
in Bagehotian terms, more dignified than efficient. 
Solicitors were a segregated, separate and unequal branch of the legal 
profession. The relationship between barrister and solicitor was a vertical, not 
a horizontal one, even though solicitors were the single source of barristers’ 
instructions. On that basis solicitors came to seek advice only in the barristers’ 
chambers. It was a breach of the bar’s professional etiquette to fraternise with 
them; or otherwise to advertise a barristers’ own expertise (such as it was) 
however discreetly. The all but omnipotent clerks acted as the barristers’ 
agent to the outside world, and could make, but also break, careers.7 
Solicitors enjoyed no rights of audience in the higher courts of law, where 
silks still appeared with juniors who were paid 2/3rds of their leader’s fee.  
Judicial appointments were made entirely from the ranks of Bar. The Lord 
Chancellor by means of the usual – but archaic – processes of consultation 
himself determined who should become a Queen’s Counsel or a Judge.  It was 
clear that some who aspired to such status had a black mark against them; but 
who had put it there was obscure; and there was no formal means by which it 
could be exposed, still less eradicated. It was assumed that most barristers did 
aspire to the High Court Bench. If invited to accept such an appointment, a 
QC was expected to accept it; and one Judge, Harry Fisher, who swiftly 
abandoned the office, first in favour of City and then of University life, after 
brief exposure – I parody – to the monotony of personal injury litigation in 
                                                     
7 See the obituary of Ron Burley, clerk to, amongst others, Lord Alexander, Lord 
Phillips, Sir Sidney Kentridge QC, and Jonathan Sumption QC in The Times 8th April 
2010. 
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Sunderland, punctuated by the occasional affray in Darlington, was regarded 
as having done that which a gentleman should not do. 
In Court the tradition of oral advocacy and oral evidence was unchecked: 
precedents relied on would not infrequently be recited in full. Judges 
conventionally declined to read any papers before coming into court in case it 
prejudiced their otherwise open minds. They acted as referees, determining 
who won or lost, penalising breach of rules, but otherwise uninvolved. Cases 
would be frequently adjourned for “Counsel’s Convenience” or sometimes 
because the Judge had “a public duty to perform” – occasionally a 
euphemistic synonym for an invitation to a Royal garden party. Barristers 
uniquely among the profession were immune from suits for negligence8, 
although also they could not sue for their fees. The only established form of 
dispute resolution, alternative to litigation, after the demise long since of the 
duel, was arbitration. 
The technology to support such litigation was immature. Typewriters 
were at best electric, not electronic: the fax machine had but recently arrived 
on the scene; the word processor was unheard of.  Blackberries were still fruit.  
Copying files was a laborious process. Conferences took place face to face.   
Research was done in libraries. Judges recorded evidence and argument in 
manuscript. 
Under the legal aid system inaugurated in 1949,9 in broad terms anyone 
who satisfied a means and merits tests could walk through the door of any 
solicitor who was entitled, regardless of expertise, to take with Counsel’s 
assistance, a case through from start to finish at public expense. 
England was truly an off-shore island in the legal world. Although QCs 
could still travel to exotic regions of the old Empire - Singapore, Malaysia, 
Hong Kong, the Caribbean islands, newly independent African states – to 
appear in full fig and with white wig in courtrooms cooled only by revolving 
fans, the domestic common law was uninfluenced by the law of the Common 
Market, or by the European Convention on Human Rights. The writings of 
academics were only cited in court after their authors were dead, but not, by 
venerable tradition, before. 
Fast forward the clock to 2010, four and a half decades later. How 
different is the picture!   
Barristers are still called to the Bar by the Inns of Court – institutions of 
medieval origin but with considerable staying power, but the Bar is now a 
wholly graduate profession. Pupillage is still a necessary part of the aspirant 
barrister’s education; but it is preceded even for those, who with law degrees, 
are spared the monotony of the Graduate Diploma in Law by a year’s specific 
                                                     
8 Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191. 
9 See for its development Walker and Walker The English Legal System (Oxford: 
OUP, 10th edn, 2008) pp 403-404. 
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training by the Bar Professional Training Course10 in such matters as 
advocacy, negotiation, client relations and other matters which previously the 
fledging barrister had been expected to acquire by a mysterious osmotic 
process.   
Pupils no longer pay for the privilege of pupillage, now itself a structured 
training programme; on the contrary the major sets of chambers fall over 
themselves to offer substantial scholarships of up to £50,000 per annum to 
attract the best and brightest of their generation. OLPAS, the Mark 2 model of 
PACH – the pupil’s application clearing house, itself based on UCAS, 
restricts the window for applications to a specified time of the year – in 
common with professional football transfers – to prevent unseemly 
competition. 
The barristers’ formal attire of yesteryear gathers mothballs in the attic.  
Dark suits are still obligatory – although the concept of darkness appears 
somewhat flexible. Women, who now constitute 58% of those admitted to the 
profession, usually wear the trousers.    
Minority ethnic counsel are on the rise, constituting almost 24% of pupils 
in 2007.    
Chambers are larger. In Birmingham two sets have more than 100 tenants. 
My old set now numbers 75, of whom almost half are QCs. It has been 
rechristened Blackstone in the modern style, where no significant figure in 
English legal history from Bracton and Erskine, to Denning and Wilberforce 
has not been pillaged to add borrowed lustre to a chamber’s name – not to 
speak of Matrix, professional home of Cherie Booth, which has looked to 
Hollywood rather than history or the House of Lords for inspiration in its title.   
Tenants, and pupils, are chosen by a rigorous process conforming to 
modern best practice, informed by anti-discrimination legislation and the 
Human Rights Act. And not only is it now conventional for upwardly mobile 
barristers to move to different sets, but transfers are even solicited, again just 
as they are between football clubs. 
The clerks, a durable race, have been supplemented by Practice Managers 
or even by Chief Executives – all now salaried. The clerk’s 10% has gone 
with the wind, once it was appreciated that its survival would guarantee the 
recipient an income far in excess of that enjoyed by the highest earning 
barrister.   
The Bar itself has been affected by waves of legislative regulation: the 
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, the Access to Justice Act 1999, the 
Legal Services Act 2007. In order to react to but also to anticipate further 
control, the Bar Council has become an executive engine, spawning 
committees, position papers and guidelines on every subject from 
international relations to maternity leave; the Chairmanship is a full time post. 
                                                     
10 Formerly the Bar Vocational Course. 
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The balance of power between the professions has shifted. Barristers will 
dispense advice in solicitor’s offices. Solicitors are no longer prohibited 
guests; but encouraged to attend chambers’ parties, where they are wooed 
with champagne and canapés – some would say excessively. Movement 
within the Bar is paralleled by movement from one profession to another.  
Between the Bar and solicitors is no longer a Rubicon but a rivulet. 
There is a wealth of legal directories in which lawyers’ specialities can be 
recorded. It is nonetheless irritating to be flattered by some publisher as a 
leading expert in a particular field, but then invited to pay several hundred 
pounds so that this remarkable piece of intelligence can be broadcast to the 
wider world. These weighty volumes proliferate with their own ranking lists, 
treated by barristers with reverence or contempt depending on how they are 
personally assessed – in the same way as politicians variously treat opinion 
polls. There are the lawyers’ equivalent of the Oscar and BAFTA ceremonies 
held in the ballrooms of leading London hotels in which titles such as 
“Construction and Technology Junior of the Year” are handed out by celebrity 
compères.  
Solicitors, subject only to fulfilment of certain criteria in terms of 
experience and training, have rights of audience in the highest courts, where 
QCs now often appear without the buttress of a Junior. As quid pro quo the 
Bar has promoted direct access, cutting out the solicitor middleman.  This has 
not, despite dire predictions, brought a halt to the expansion of the 
independent Bar. When I was called there were 2,300 barristers in 
independent practice: now there are over 12,000. In the law’s house there are 
many mansions. There will always be scope for the buccaneer as well as the 
backroom boy. 
Solicitors can aspire too to the highest judicial posts: QCs as well as 
Judges are chosen by Commissions with a strong lay component.11   
But the Bench itself is no longer the inevitable culmination of a successful 
career at the Bar. The charms of college or boardroom, a preference for 
advocacy over adjudication and the growing gulf between the income of a 
fashionable silk and even the Lord Chief Justice has ensured that by no means 
all who could be on the High Court bench are, or, increasingly, will be. 
Modern technology has transformed the operation of the law. Video 
conferencing has become common. Courts can accommodate simultaneous 
display of evidence on screen. Submissions are handed up and judgments 
handed down on disk. Research is increasingly done through the electronic 
                                                     
11 The Lord Chancellor’s residual and qualified right of veto over senior judges can 
delay but not determine the outcome, as is shown by the recent appointment of an 
outspoken critic of the government’s policies on children to the Presidency of the 
Family Division. 
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database and the world-wide-web. Professor Richard Susskind has termed the 
lawyers of the future “legal information engineers”.   
In Court, influenced by civilian and transatlantic example, written now 
accompanies oral advocacy. Skeleton arguments and witness statements have 
to be provided. Judges are expected to read them in advance, and some indeed 
do. They have become case managers controlling the timing and pace of 
litigation, conscious of the need to meet targets and to cut costs. Barristers can 
be sued for negligence;12 and even exposed to wasted costs orders.13  They are 
obliged to carry insurance but can enter into contracts to provide legal 
services to their professional clients. Adjudication has been part privatised, 
with mediation and other forms of ADR14 supplementing more conventional 
arbitration. 
There is a Community Legal Service and a Criminal Defence Service – a 
system of state defenders – to complement the Crown Prosecution Service.  
Old style conventional legal aid for civil work has swept away – it no longer 
exists for personal injury claims or most damages actions, and the Legal 
Services Commission enters into franchised contracts with vetted practitioners 
to provide services. Conditional fees are now allowed to support privately 
funded litigation.    
It is closing time in the Gardens of the East. Malaysia has ceased to be an 
area where English silks can appear; Singapore almost so, and, even in Hong 
Kong the Bar Council operates a justifiable protectionist policy. Strasbourg 
and Luxembourg have provided new fora to replace the old.   
In civilian terms doctrine as well as jurisprudence can be relied on in 
litigation: and living academics can collect the number of their citations in 
judgments as well as in the footnotes in prestigious journals. Comparative law 
has infiltrated forensic argument. As Tom Bingham presciently noted “There 
is a world out there”.15 
But has the transformation of the context transformed the content? Are the 
values and the virtues of the Bar what they were? Can they, and should they, 
survive this tsunami of reform,16 whether imposed from without or generated 
from within? 
Tom Bingham, amplifying his much quoted Williams Lecture on the rule 
of law into a slim volume, wrote in his chapter on a Fair Trial: 
                                                     
12 Arthur Hall v Simmons [2002] 1 AC 615: See too May & Peltman [2005] 1 WLR 
581. 
13 CLSA Section 5: substituting a new Section 51 in the Supreme Court Act 1981 and 
Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 ep p236, Medcalfe v Mardell [2003] 1 AC 120. 
14 H Brown and A Marriott ADR Principles (Sweet and Maxwell, 1999). 
15 The FA Mann Lecture (1992) 41 ICLQ at 513-529. 
16 See M Burrage Revolution and the Making of the Contemporary Legal Profession  
(OUP, 2006) Ch 14 XVI and XVII. 
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“scarcely less important than an independent judiciary is an 
independent legal profession, fearless in its representation of those 
who cannot represent themselves, however unpopular or distasteful 
their case may be.”17  
 
In that single sentence are identified three elements crucial to the Bar’s 
ethos18: availability, fearlessness and independence – but the greatest of these 
is independence. 
It is the availability as much as the quality of representation which is the 
guarantee provided by the Bar. Under the so-called cab-rank rule any barrister 
not otherwise engaged or conflicted out and competent in the relevant area of 
law must appear for any client willing and able to pay an appropriate fee, even 
if he disapproves of the clients’ character or cause.19 It was said to be, in one 
analysis of legal ethics “to barristers what the Hippocratic oath is to doctors”. 
In Arthur Hall v Simmons20 the Law Lords variously described it “a 
valuable professional rule”21 or “ethic”,22 a “long and honourable tradition”,23 
as “a fundamental and essential part of a liberal legal system”24 and  
 
“a public duty which advocates perform without regard to such private 
considerations such as general gain or personal inconvenience.25.   
 
In the same case various rationales were supplied. The rule ensures that 
no-one is left without representation even the most  
 
“unpopular and anti-social.”26  
 
“It protects barristers against being criticised for giving their services 
to a client with a bad reputation.”27   
 
                                                     
17 (Penguin, 2010) pp 92-93. 
18 As to which see generally: A Boon and J Levon The Ethics and Conduct of 
Lawyers in England and Wales (Hart, 1999) Ch 14 “Advocacy Services”. 
19 See now The Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (“CLSA”) s 17(3)(a).   
20 [2002] 1 AC 612. See further Adoyomi v Radford [2008] QB 793, holding that its 
effect was not prospective only. 
21 Lord Steyn at 678. 
22 Lord Hoffman at 686. 
23 Lord Hope at 714. 
24 Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough at 739. 
25 Lord Hope at 714. 
26 Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough at 739. 
27 Lord Hoffman at 686. 
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“It negates the identification of the advocate with the cause of his 
client and therefore assists to provide him with protection against 
governmental or popular victimisation.”28   
 
Some have elsewhere pitched its justification high. Erskine defended his 
own defence of Thomas Paine, author of the Rights of Man, with the words: 
 
“From the moment that any advocate can be permitted to say that he 
will or will not stand between the Crown and the subject from that 
moment the liberties of England are at an end.”29   
 
Some have pitched it low. Geoffrey Robertson QC wrote: 
 
“it reduces the amount of excrement through the letter box.’’30 
 
Yet the virtues of the cab rank rule are not always recognised outside the 
profession. 
The abolitionist Granville Sharp, the prime mover in Somerset’s case31 
when Lord Mansfield famously determined that slavery was unlawful in 
England, criticised Dunning, Counsel for slave owner, who had represented a 
slave in an earlier case for his forensic volte face, recording his disapproval 
of: 
 
“an abominable and insufferable practice in lawyers, to undertake 
cases diametrically opposed to their own declared opinions of law and 
common justice.”32 
 
And when I appeared within the Committee of Privileges in a vain effort 
to postpone the ejection of the hereditary peers from the House of Lords,33 
Margaret Jay, then Leader of the House, came up to me in the Moses Room 
shortly before the hearing and expressed her surprise at my appearance, as she 
phrased it, “on that side”. But when some years later in an article in The 
Spectator I suggested that retired members of the University who lived in 
Oxford had no more obvious right to vote on the University affairs than 
hereditary peers to participate in the deliberations of the Upper House, Lord 
Trefgarne, one of my sometime clients, wrote a letter complaining that my 
                                                     
28 Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough at 739-40. 
29 1792 22 State Trials 358 at 412. 
30 G Robertson The Justice Game (Chatto & Windus, 1998) pp 377-9. 
31 1772 20 State TV1. 
32 E Heward Lord Mansfield (Barry Rose, 1998) p 145. 
33 Lord Mayhew of Twisden’s Petition [2002] 1 AC 109. 
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views seemed inconsistent with my representation of the hereditary interests 
in the earlier litigation.  
Others have suggested that the rule is more mantra, than mandate. Lord 
Steyn in Arthur Hall said: 
  
“Its impact on the administration of justice is not great. In real life a 
barrister has a clerk whose enthusiasm for unwanted brief may not be 
great, and he is free to raise the fee within limits.”34  
 
Yet the menace, if any, comes less from avarice than from ideology. In 
setting up chambers, in Lambeth as a barristers’ co-operative where profit was 
not the prime mover, Lord Gifford, hereditary peer and soi-disant Passionate 
Advocate said: 
  
“we let it be known that we would not want to prosecute cases for 
police, nor would we act for landlords against tenants or for employers 
against employees.”35   
 
Threatened with disciplinary proceedings by the Bar Council, he 
ingeniously defended that stance on the basis that his Chambers had indicated 
a preference, not imposed a prohibition. But even in sets which house the 
alternative Bar or those of avowedly left of centre persuasion, there is no 
reason to believe or evidence to support that their members could, or indeed 
would purge from themselves what the current Chairman has called “the DNA 
of the Bar”.36 
As a barrister cannot disdain neither can he prejudge his clients’ case Dr 
Johnson said: 
 
“A lawyer has no business with the justice or injustice of the cause 
which he undertakes, unless his client asks his opinion, and then he is 
bound to give it honestly. The justice or injustice of the cause is to be 
decided by the judge.”37 
                                                     
34 Lord Hobhouse at 739 “Regrettably not all barristers observe it even though such 
failure involves a breach of their professional code”. 
35 A Gifford The Passionate Advocate (Wildy, Simmons and Hill, 2007) p 19. 
(Hereafter: “Gifford”). 
36 Bar Council Chairman Inaugural Speech: Nicholas Green QC 7th December 2009 
“No one has been reported in recent years for any alleged infringement of the cab-
rank rule, and particularly in the criminal sphere it is a rule which is zealously 
observed.” Thornton cit sup. 
37 Dr Johnson 15 August 1773, in J Boswell The Journey of a Tour to the Hebrides 
with Samuel Johnson, LLD, 1785.  
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So does the barrister then, in accepting a brief, become monocular or may 
he have a broader vision? 
Henry Brougham to justify his controversial defence of Queen Caroline 
proclaimed: 
 
“An advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows in 
the discharge of that office but one person in the client and none other, 
…he must go on reckless of the consequences, even if his fate it 
should unhappily be, to involve his country in confusion for his clients 
protection.’’38 
 
By contrast Lord MacMillan, a Law Lord, commented extracurially: 
 
“In the discharge of his office the advocate has a duty to his client, a 
duty to his opponent, a duty to the Court, a duty to the State, and a 
duty to himself. To maintain a perfect poise amidst these various and 
sometimes conflicting claims is no easy feat.”39 
 
Amongst that quintet of perceived obligations, only a pair may command 
general agreement – the duty to the Court and the duty to the client, the 
former wrongly omitted from Brougham’s catalogue of one. As is recorded in 
the Gospel according to St. Matthew no man may serve two masters;40 but a 
barrister must. He owes, as Lord Hoffmann put it “a divided loyalty”,41 for 
the duty to the client is subordinate to advocate’s principal duty.  Lord 
Denning gave a classic enunciation of the duty’s pith and purpose. He said of 
the barrister: 
 
“He has a duty to the court which is paramount. It is a mistake to 
suppose that he is the mouthpiece of his client to say what he wants: 
or his tool to do what he directs. He is none of these things. He owes 
allegiance to a higher cause. It is the cause of truth and justice.”42 
 
                                                     
38 Quoted in D Nicholson and J Webb Professional Legal Ethics (OUP, 2000 ) p 162. 
39 H MacMillan The Ethics of Advocacy in Law and Other Things (Cambridge 1938) 
p 185. 
40 Matthew 6.24. 
41 Arthur Hall 628. 
42 Rondel v Worsley [1967] 1 QB 443 at 502.  
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The practical effects of this duty now enshrined in statute43 are many,44 
and illuminated by a wealth of judicial dicta. 
An advocate may not deceive or knowingly mislead the court45 nor allow 
the judge to take what he knows to be a bad point in his client’s favour.46 He 
must bring to the attention of the court all relevant decisions and legislative 
provisions of which he is aware, even those that are adverse to his argument.47  
He must conduct the proceedings economically and “not waste time on 
irrelevancies even if the client thinks they are important”,48and 
notwithstanding, as the Chief Justice of Australia Anthony Mason graphically 
put it, that  
 
“the client may wish to chase every rabbit down every burrow”.49  
 
Still less may he “take false points however much his client may insist he 
should do so”.50 He must help the court to further the overriding objective of 
the Civil Procedure Rules.51 He must not set his name to a plea which “he 
does not consider to be properly arguable”.52 
                                                     
43 See sections 27(2A) and 28(2A) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 as 
inserted by section 42 of the Access to Justice Act 1999. 
Section 27(2A) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (CLSA 1990) provides: 
‘Every person who exercises before any court a right of audience granted by an 
authorised body has –  
a duty to the court to act with independence in the interests of justice; and  
a duty to comply with rules of conduct of the body relating to the right and approved 
for the purposes of this section 
and those duties shall override any obligation which the person may have (otherwise 
than under the criminal law) if it is inconsistent with them.’ See too Basic Principles 
on the Role of Lawyers adopted in 1990 by the Eighth United Nations Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders Principle 14. Lawyers should at 
all times at “freely and diligently in accordance with the law and recognised standard 
and ethics of the legal profession”. They are also of course found dispersed 
throughout the Bar Council’s Code of Conduct, the first edition of which dates only to 
1980. 
44 See generally DA “Lawyers’ Duties to the Court” (1998) 114 LQR 63. 
45 Frape v Emreco International Limited [2002] EuLR 10 per Lord McEwan [21]. 
46 Lord Hoffmann: Arthur Hall: 686 Meek v Fleming [1961] 2 QB 366. 
47 Lord Hoffmann: Arthur Hall: 686.   
48 Arthur Hall: Lord Hoffmann at 686. 
49 Gianarelli   v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543 at 556. 
50 Arthur Hall: Lord Hope at 715. 
51 per Arden LJ in Geveran Trading Co. Ltd v Skjevesland [2003] 1 WLR 912 [37] 
52 R v Horsham District Council ex parte Wenman [1995] 1 WLR 680 per Brooke J at 
p 698. 
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He must not unjustly make a charge of fraud, without evidence to support 
it.53 He must see that his client disclose relevant documents, even those that 
may be fatal to his case.54   
These principles apply to barristers in criminal as well as in civil 
proceedings. Prosecuting counsel play an important public role in promotion 
of an open and fair criminal justice system,55 so the Bar Council prescribes: 
 
“Prosecuting counsel should not attempt to obtain a conviction by all 
means at his command”.56 
 
– although Mervyn Griffith-Jones QC qualified this by warning Middle 
Temple Students in 1973  
 
“don’t act as second defending counsel as some young men seem to 
think they should do in order to be fair”.57  
 
When, twelve years earlier, prosecuting Penguin Books, the publishers of 
Lady Chatterley’s Lover, as Crown Counsel he lost the jury’s sympathy in his 
opening speech by asking them whether it was a book that a jury man would 
like his wife or servants – I stress the plural - to read,58 he was presumably not 
anticipating his own later advice.  
While the defence lawyer’s role in criminal proceedings is essentially 
partisan,59 he is still required to place the interests of justice first.60 
If his client confesses his guilt prior to trial, he is limited to testing the 
strength of the prosecution case. He must not ‘set up an affirmative case 
                                                     
53 Brown v Bennett (No 2) [2002] 1 WLR 713 [104] per Neuberger J. 
54 Rondel v Worsley 1967 QB at 502 per Lord Denning MR). In Vernon v Bosley (No 
2) [1999] QB 18, a disclosure case Thorpe LJ said at p 64 “In general terms the 
balance between the advocate's duty to the client and the advocate's duty to the court 
must reflect evolutionary change within the civil justice system. If evolutionary shifts 
are necessary to match civil justice reforms they should in my judgment be towards 
strengthening the duty to the court”.  
55 See the Farquharson Guidelines on the Role and Responsibilities of the Prosecution 
Advocate (published by the Crown Prosecution Service). 
56 The Bar Council’s Written Standards for the Conduct of Professional Work para 
10.1. 
57 Basic Elements of Advocacy: Mervyn Griffith-Jones MC Reading 1973, Middle 
Temple Hall p 10. 
58 C Rolph The Trial of Lady Chatterley: Regina v Penguin Books Limited (Penguin, 
1990). 
59 R v Puddick (1865) 4 F & F 497 at 499 per Crompton J. A Ashworth The Criminal 
Process (Oxford, 2nd edn, 1998) p 69. 
60 See generally, R v McFadden (1975) 62 Cr App R 187. 
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inconsistent with that confession nor call evidence in support of an alibi or 
otherwise which he knows to be untrue.61   
 
Subject to that proviso, as again the Bar Council prescribes: 
 
“It is the duty of counsel when defending an accused on a criminal 
charge to present to the court fearlessly and without regard to his 
personal interests.”62 
 
Counsel may be partially consoled, by the obiter dictum of Lord Justice 
James in R v McFadden: 
 
“Forensic techniques may vary from time to time but it is still possible 
to point to success at the Bar based upon a reputation for courage in 
standing up to the judge when occasion demands.”63  
 
It is, however, worth pausing for a moment to reflect upon the 
significance of this unusual constraint, and to imagine its impact if were 
transposed, mutatis mutandis, as we were once permitted, but no longer, to 
say in submissions to the Court, to other arenas. We are a mere fortnight away 
from a general election in which politicians appealed to the verdict of the 
people, who gave what might reasonably be described as a reserved judgment, 
indeed a split decision. During the campaign - and I make no partisan point-
there was a wealth of examples, in the language of old fashioned pleading too 
numerous to specify, of suppressio veri – economy with the truth - if not of 
suggestio falsi. Imagine for a moment how the democratic process would be 
transformed and improved if politicians were under a duty not to deform 
statistics, or to make full and frank disclosure, of material, say, relating to the 
national debt. Imagine for a moment if cricketers walked, footballers refrained 
from diving, rugby players from committing that contradiction in terms the 
professional foul, or team managers in any game from berating match 
officials, how that too would purify the culture of sport. That barristers 
operate in this unusual way is not a testament, of course, to their inherent 
morality; they are cut from the same crooked timber of humanity as all of us.  
But as with the cab-rank rule, the duty to the court, the second pillar of the 
Bar’s wisdom, is something rare and precious, to be preserved and protected. 
                                                     
61 Written Standards for the Conduct of Professional Work paragraphs 12.1 and 12.4, 
though see the provocatively entitled A McBride Defending The Guilty, Truth and 
Lies in the Criminal Courtroom (Viking, 2010). 
62 Ditto. 
63 (1975) 62 Crim App Rep at 187. 
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In my view the duty to the Court, deeply embedded in the English 
common law tradition, no more acts as an undesirable restraint on the 
barrister’s freedom of action than do the Queensberry rules on professional 
pugilists. Indeed, as the same Chief Justice of Australia said, it fortifies him in 
the exercise of an independent discretion or judgment in the conduct and 
management of a case.64 
How far then should the barrister himself fortify the structures of 
independence? Should a barrister be a cause lawyer or a case lawyer?  
Autobiographies with titles such as Memoirs of a Radical Advocate65 or even 
the Passionate Advocate,66 (more intriguing perhaps than even “72 years at 
the Bar”), are accounts of the careers of advocates who, without violating the 
cab-rank rule, wear on their sleeve not only their hearts, but their minds.  Why 
do I prefer an alternative style in which the barrister’s views are as private as 
his vote, even accepting the price to be paid in erosion of civic commitment 
and even of moral sensibility? 
There are two reasons: one is actuality, one is appearance. 
The function of the advocate to give advice and then to conduct a case 
with detachment, his only passion being for success on behalf of his client.  
Ideological, or emotional involvement in an outcome seems to me to risk 
infection of analysis and presentation. I am very conscious that when I am on 
the side of the case I prefer, I have to guard against an excess of the adrenalin 
– not an exogenous prohibited substance - essential to the most effective 
advocacy. In 1976 I appeared in an unsuccessful effort to preserve St 
Marylebone Grammar school, the last of its kind in London, Lord Denning in 
one of his most elegiac passages was able to indicate how he would have 
wished to decide the case. “Many will grieve” he said “when that which was 
great is passed away. But so it must be”.67 I grieved too, but necessarily in 
silence. 
More recently I fear that my dislike of the Strasbourg inspired rule that the 
United Kingdom cannot deport individuals, proven to be a threat to its own 
national security, to their country of origin because of concerns about risk of 
the treatment they would there receive may, despite my best endeavours, have 
percolated into my submissions before House of Lords as a sub-text if not in 
the text itself. Lord Hope felt constrained to address full frontally the 
argument: 
 
                                                     
64 Gianelli v Wright cit sup. 
65 By Michael Mansfield (Bloomsbury, 2009). 
66 Lord Gifford cit sup. 
67 Smith v ILEA [1978] 1 All ER 411 at p 418. 
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“surely the sooner they are got rid of the better. On their own heads be 
it if their extremist views expose them to the risk of ill-treatment when 
they got home”.68 
 
and administered what Touchstone called the “reproof valiant”.69   
 
“That, however, is not the way the rule of law works. The lesson of 
history is that, by depriving people of its protection, because of their 
beliefs and behaviour, however obnoxious, leads to the disintegration 
of society.”70 
 
Clients, be they prisoners, parents or public authorities, may welcome the 
barrister’s sympathy as well as his skill, but they are, best served if they 
enjoy, without any sacrifice of courtesy on the barrister’s part, only the latter. 
The case he advances is after all his client’s not his own: that is why the 
advocate formally abstains from any expression of belief, and deploys the 
neutral concept of submission.71 But how he advances it must be the product 
of his own best dispassionate judgement. Alastair Campbell in his diaries 
records of Jonathan Sumption QC, briefed in the Hutton Enquiry: 
 
“It was absolutely clear that he was not taking something out “(Sc: of 
the diaries) just because the Prime Minister would do,”72 
 
and concluded: 
 
“What I admired about Sumption most was that he didn’t seem to care 
what the press or public were thinking about this. He was totally 
focussed on the judge”.73 
 
In circumstances of far less gravity I once had myself to tell my 
instructing solicitor that my client could promote his case with Max Clifford 
or with Michael Beloff but not with both. After, in Wednesbury terms, taking 
all material considerations into account, the barrister must, as Frank Sinatra 
would have recommended, do it his way. 
                                                     
68 RB (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] 2 WLR 512. 
69 As You Like It: Act V Scene IV adopted by Lord Denning in Ex p Hook [1976] 1 
WLR 1052 at 1053. 
70 At [209-210]. 
71 Thornton cit sup 88. 
72 A Campbell The Blair Years (Hutchinson, 2007) p 746. 
73 754. 
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It is, of course, difficult for emotions to become engaged in a question of 
construction of an arcane provision of the Hague Visby rules, or even of the 
obscure outer boundaries of the volatile Law of negligence. And although 
those who practice in the fields of criminal may from time to time develop a 
strong belief in a client’s innocence as those who practice in the field of 
family law may empathise with a client in custody disputes, the issues in 
those cases do not easily fit into some ideological template. 
It is the development of public law and its supplanting of private law as 
the most important element in appellate adjudication, and the concurrent 
migration of political issues from the legislature to the courts which expose 
the advocate more readily to the temptations of partisanship and more 
importantly to the perception of it. 
In his foreword to a leading commentary on human rights practice Lord 
Phillips, previous holder of the triple crown of Master of the Rolls, Lord Chief 
Justice and Senior Law Lord, and who has now – to mix the sporting 
metaphor - achieved the grand slam by becoming first President of the 
Supreme Court – reminisced: 
  
“…when I practised at the Bar, the staple diet of the House of Lords 
consisted of civil law and tax appeals... Judicial Review was in its 
infancy.... How things have changed. Baroness Hale and we, her 
colleagues, devote the majority of our energies to public law. The 
Human Rights Act 1998 bears significant responsibility for this 
change”.74 
 
In this new environment I am particularly uncomfortable with the too 
ready association of the barrister with his clients’ case. 
In the highly sensitive and increasingly complex field of immigration law 
in which, in my far off days as a junior, I used regularly to practice, I noted 
the significant attachment of clients to lawyers of their own ethnic 
background, not always to the advantage of their claim,75 sometimes because 
their chosen champion had inadequate command of the language in which the 
Court had to be addressed.76 I am uncomfortable too with the converse 
                                                     
74 Lester A, Pannick D & Herberg J Human Rights Law and Practice (LexisNexis, 3rd 
edn, 2009). 
75 The Report of the Lord Chancellor’s Advising Committee on Legal Education and 
Conduct (ACLEC) 1996 said in the UK immigration field barristers in order to delay 
deportation of a client may certify cases as appropriate for legal aid when they are 
clearly not. 
76 The language problem has, it appears, not entirely evaporated. “I was called to the 
Bar in 2006 and, as a British woman of Indian descent, I can hardly be accused of 
racism. So I perhaps feel freer to speak than some of my colleagues. But we all see 
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position when women advocates are instructed to defend men on trial for rape 
– not on account of their forensic abilities but on the crude calculation that 
juries will be beguiled into thinking that no woman would defend someone 
who had committed an act of violence against members of their own sex. 
I do not believe that barristers of known left wing sympathies are 
necessarily based placed to defend striking Trade Unionists or those of 
publicised Europhobic tendencies to represent UKIP. A barrister who can 
appear at different times for the BNP and the Socialist Workers League, is not 
the forensic equivalent of the Vicar of Bray, but an adherent to the true 
professional faith. It is dangerous to adopt a mindset that virtue can only 
repose on the claimants’ side (or vice-versa). For it is not only the advocates 
for claimants but those for respondents too who are responsible for assisting 
in the construction or clarification of the law. Barristers, after all, do not make 
law, they supply from either side of the Court, the materials from which the 
judges can fulfil their own distinctive role. 
In an essay entitled “Early Days”77 Lord Justice Sedley reminisces about 
his triumphs and disasters as a novice barrister, present at the creation of 
modern judicial review. It is an exhilarating and entertaining account of his 
role in seminal cases involving gypsies, low income tenants, immigrants and 
prisoners. In some of those I was myself involved; in the self-same case about 
control units, the product of a philosophy which was tough on crime, if not 
necessarily on its cause, being led by Stephen at first instance, and leading 
him in the Court of Appeal, the result of an idiosyncratic silk selection by the 
then Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham.78 But it never occurred to me that I 
was, or could be thought to be, bent on advancing some radical political 
agenda. I was simply doing my daily job. Lesser advocates than Stephen can, 
if they always appear on the same side of the argument, cause confusion in the 
minds of those who try the case between the client and his advocate to the 
detriment of the former.  It is surely axiomatic that a barrister’s arguments, 
whether mediated through advice or advocacy, will be given greater weight 
and respect if he is recognised by any test to be truly independent. 
The recent case of McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited79 provides a much 
publicised example of what I have in mind. A psycho-sexual therapist failed 
                                                                                                                              
the same thing: the race card being played in recruitment to legal forms and to the 
Crown Prosecution Service. In pubs near chambers you often hear tales of friends 
finding themselves up against lawyers who can barely speak English and are unable 
to grasp complex points of law”. S Patel, The Race Card upsets the Scales of Justice , 
The Sunday Times, 28th February 2010. 
77 In D Dyzenhaus A Simple Common Lawyer: Essays in Honour of Michael Taggart 
(Hart, 2009). 
78 William v Home Office No2 [1981] 1 All ER 1211, 1982 All ER 564. 
79 Case NoA2/2009/2733. 
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in his claim for religious discrimination against his employers who had 
refused to exempt him from providing his services to same-sex couples. He 
was supported by Lord Carey, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, who in a 
witness statement invited the Lord Chief Justice to establish a Panel of Judges 
designated to hear cases involving religious rights. The Appellants’ advocate 
has a unique expertise in such cases, but as his website and record shows, is a 
legal crusader for evangelical religious values.80 A Counsel not only more 
detached but seen to be more detached from the principle contended for, of 
allowing religious belief to qualify from the rigidities of anti-discrimination 
law, might have adopted a more nuanced approach, which eschewed the 
gratuitous and doomed plea for a specialist non-secular court, trenchantly 
dismissed by Lord Justice Laws as “deeply inimical to the public interest”.  
Those who cannot appreciate that there may be two sides to a question are not 
best placed to argue in favour of one. 
Criminal law is not immune to this problem. Members of the Crown 
Prosecution Service, originally created so as to separate the functions of 
police and prosecutor have started to colonise frontline advocacy, with the 
consequent risk that as employees of a public authority they will become 
“prosecution minded and seen to be so”.81    
The era is long since gone when it was possible to combine at one and the 
same time a full time practice at the Bar with an active political career. But 
F.E. Smith, a paradigm example of someone, who, a century ago, was able to 
do both, understood well the matters at stake. 
When criticised by his fellow conservatives for representing the liberal 
Herbert Samuel in the Marconi trial he wrote to The Times: 
 
“Political issues constantly present themselves for decision in the Law 
Courts. In the overwhelming majority of cases juries have done their 
duty indifferently between the parties, treating their own views upon 
politics as immaterial. How long do you think this stage of things will 
endure if every conservative case is to be presented by Conservative 
advocates and resisted by Liberal advocates.”82 
 
                                                     
80 See Diamond v Mansfield & Ors [2006] EWHC 3290 (QB) [paras 49 and 87] See 
too the Minutes of the AGM of the Bar Council of 16th June 2007. 
81 Inaugural speech of Nicholas Green QC, Chairman of the Bar Council 7th 
December 2009. There is, and has been, a long and honourable tradition of Crown 
Counsel at Courts such as the Old Bailey, but these were aware chosen from the 
independent Bar, and at the conclusion of their tenure often promptly moved into the 
more lucrative areas of high profile defence work. 
82 Issue 17th June 1913.  
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The Law Officers face peculiar challenges. The then Attorney General 
was reported to the Bar Council for investigation that his advice to the 
Government on the legality of war in Iraq, misjudged the distinction between 
his legal and political roles. That body, in receipt of opinions by both Sir 
David and myself (provided in isolation from each other) rejected jurisdiction, 
leaving Lord Goldsmith to the no doubt tenderer mercies of the Chilcott 
Inquiry.83 It seems to me inevitable that the role of the Attorney-General will 
have to be de-constructed, like that of the Lord Chancellor, and for analogous, 
if not identical, reasons of disentangling roles seen to be in tension. Wearing 
two hats is less difficult than wearing three, but a single item of headgear is 
more becoming. 
There are institutional as well as ideological pressures on the 
independence of the Bar. Sir Gavin Lightman in a much discussed lecture 
“The Civil Justice System and Legal Profession – the Challenges Ahead”,84 
somewhat like a former cabinet minister, freed from the burdens of collective 
responsibility, rediscovered the path of true principle for the profession he had 
left a decade before. He excoriated “the metamorphosis of the legal 
professions into legal business”85 and the consequent impact on the internal 
organisation of the Bar. 
 
“The dominant philosophy today amongst many chambers”, he wrote 
“is to place the highest premium on keeping all available work for 
clients “in house”.  Indeed chambers have increasingly in all but name 
and law become partnerships between the members committed to the 
pursuant of the best interest of members.  Chambers have for practical 
purposes a corporate existence. Chambers increasingly publish legal 
works as a chambers exercise to publicise the chambers and attract the 
work to the chambers. Chambers have put into effect “rules” 
(enforced by chief executives and barristers’ clerks) that, when 
counsel has been instructed from amongst the members of the 
chambers, if that counsel requires a leader or junior, that leader or 
junior will be selected from the available pool in that chambers 
(mopping up local employment) rather than on the basis of talent or 
                                                     
83 In the event, the Bar Council concluded that it had no jurisdiction in relation to his 
position as a Minister of the Crown, though enjoying it in relation to his performance 
of his role as Counsel in court or discreditable conduct in his personal life (a decision 
of 7 July 2005).   
84 (2003) 42 Civil Justice Quarterly 235. 
85 243. See too in Arthur Hall, Lord Steyn at 682 “The world has changed since 1967.  
The practice of Law has become more commercialised.” 
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price (the relevant considerations for the client) from the available 
pool of the Bar as a whole.”86 
 
There is, if not a ring, at least a tinkle of truth in what he says. For what is 
certain is that the perception of the Bar from outside has altered. 
A decade ago,87 an issue arose whether a barrister who had been 
appointed an arbitrator by one party to the arbitration should be removed by 
the Court on the ground that another barrister from the same chambers had 
been instructed in the arbitration that gave rise to justifiable doubts about the 
arbitrator’s impartiality. 
Rix J, in rejecting the application,88 emphasised the uniqueness of the 
Bar’s organisation and the fact that it provided a structural protection both for 
the interests of the client and for the interests of justice: 
 
“It is the essence of practice at the bar, as that barristers are all self-
employed. This is not a mere matter of form. On the contrary, 
practising barristers are prohibited by the rules of their profession 
from entering partnerships or accepting employment precisely in order 
to maintain the position where they can appear against or in front of 
one another. If it were otherwise, public access to the bar would be 
severely limited: each time a member of a set of chambers accepted 
instructions, he would debar any other member of those chambers, 
although independently practising self-employed barristers, from 
accepting instructions from any other party with a different interest in 
the dispute; nor would he be able to appear before a Recorder, Deputy 
Judge or arbitrator in the same proceedings. This would be a severe 
limitation on the administration of justice in this country.”89 
 
Several years later an ICSID Tribunal, considering the converse situation 
that is, whether a QC could any longer act as counsel in a case where a 
member of the Tribunal was from the same set, decided that what Rix J had 
seen as a matter of substance was or would be seen as a matter of form.   
Accepting that de jure barristers in a set of chambers were independent of 
each other, the Tribunal ruled that they would be seen de facto as having a 
collective connotation.90   
                                                     
86 244. 
87 Laker Airways Inc v FLS Aerospace Ltd and Burnton [1999] 2 Lloyds’s Reports 45. 
88 The test under the Arbitration Act 1996 was whether circumstances existed:  
section 24(1)(a). 
89 At p 52: See too Background Information on the IBA Guidelines on conflicts of 
interest in International Arbitration. 
90 They held: 
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This warning flags are fluttering elsewhere. The Court of Arbitration for 
Sport, whose adjectival law is substantially Swiss, regard, in the words of its 
Secretary-General, the notion of a member of a set of Chambers acting as 
arbitrator when a party is represented by a member of the same set as 
“problematic”,91 although I have never in all my time at the Bar expected, still 
less received, favours from judges whom I know well. 
The problem will be exacerbated if barristers exploit the permission newly 
given, to work in partnerships, or in both a self-employed and employed 
capacity at the same time (though not in the same case!),92 or to become 
managers in and hold shares in Legal Disciplinary Practices (LDPs), the more 
so if they participate in the Alternative Business Structures (“ABS”) 
contemplated by the same legislation which would allow them to work 
alongside both other legal professionals and non-lawyers – a development 
optimistically described by Lord Falconer as the legal system’s Tesco. The 
influence of outside ownership, the promotion of profit over professional 
standards, and the commodification of legal issues, all threats inherent in 
these putative entities may yet cause us to mourn the eclipse of – at one and 
the same time - to embroider the analogy - the neighbourhood cornershop and 
Harrods. 
Similar concerns are generated by the serious commercial pressures on 
substantial sections of the Bar. Within what the Chairman of the Bar has 
recently called “an increasingly broad church’’93 there are in fact many Bars. 
                                                                                                                              
“The objection in this case is not predicated on any actual lack of independence or 
impartiality, but on apprehensions of the appearance of impropriety.  In the interest of 
the legitimacy of these proceedings, the arbitrators consider that the Claimant is 
entitled to make this objection and that it is well founded.” but mitigated this by 
adding: 
“The Tribunal does not believe there is a hard-and-fast rule to the effect that barristers 
from the same Chambers are always precluded from being involved as, respectfully, 
counsel and arbitrator in the same cases. Equally, however, there is no absolute rule to 
opposite effect. The justification of an apprehension of partiality depends on all 
relevant circumstances.”. 
Indeed in 2010 a Tribunal acting within the same jurisdiction affirmed the power to 
exclude counsel, but declined to do so, and distinguished the earlier case 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/RompetrolParticipation.pdf - last accessed 2nd June 
2011. 
91 A letter sent by him to me when a party represented by a member of my Chambers 
sought to appoint me as arbitrator. 
92 The Legal Services Board approved the Bar Standards Board applications designed 
to relax provisions in the Code of Conduct for barristers working practices. Counsel: 
May 2010, BSB News IV. The fons et origo of these developments was the Legal 
Services Act 2007. 
93 Chairman’s Report January 2010. 
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Those who depend upon public funds, in particular in the areas of criminal 
and family law, suffer, if not death, at least damage by a thousand cuts. Freeze 
has been followed by fall. Judicial review of the latest pre-election 
Government decision was briefly on the agenda.94 
The outgoing Minister for Justice retorted by identifying, with less than 
complete accuracy, the top legal aid earners for 2008-2009 as if the income of 
the few was characteristic of the income of the many. The hourly earnings of 
the majority were, in a counter-attack, described by the Chairman of the 
Criminal Bar Association as less than those of a garage mechanic.95 This led 
predictably to an amusing, if unedifying correspondence in the letter column 
of the Times as to which provided a more valuable social service.   
The real victims, of course, will be the most vulnerable members of 
society - who are not, I hasten to add, the barristers themselves - to whom the 
barristers, distracted by a wish, in no way dishonourable, to receive a 
reasonable income for demanding work will increasingly be inhibited in their 
ability to provide proper representation, and may be even compelled to avail 
themselves of the exit route permitted by the cab-rank rule itself. 
The palliative of conditional fee agreements, shifting the burden of 
financing of many types of litigation from state to persons, natural or legal,96 
and now available in all except criminal and specified family proceedings, 
confers on barristers, as Sir Gavin Lightman pointed out: 
 
“a financial interest in the outcome of litigation in which they are 
engaged which is calculated to create unacceptable conflicts of 
interest and duty and creates unacceptable pressures to win.”97  
 
In this uncertain financial climate Baroness Deech, the Chairman of the 
BSB, has said: 
 
“We have to negotiate a path between the Scylla of fusion and the 
Charybdis of attrition of the Bar.”98 
 
In identifying the perils on that path I have sought tonight to make a 
summary case for the survival of a professional, independent in mind, spirit 
and appearance, and a member of a profession itself independent, [though not 
unaccountable]; capable when called upon, of defending individual rights 
against the power of an ever burgeoning state and its sundry satrapies, but 
                                                     
94 Counsel May 2010 p 4. 
95 Letter The Times March 29th 2010. 
96 See Walker and Walker, Above n 9 pp 400-401, 525-527. 
97 Above n 86, at p 243. 
98 Speech to the Young Bar Association October 2nd 2009. 
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equally of representing the state when it seeks to enforce the public interest 
against those who act in a way inimical to it. In a surface sense everything has 
changed. In a subterranean one nothing has - or should. The environment in 
which the Bar operates at any one time may be ephemeral: but its values must 
be eternal. 
In his book The End of Lawyers?99 Richard Susskind, a proselytiser for 
information technology explains, albeit in a footnote. 
 
“I reiterate the question mark in the title is intended to confirm that 
this book is an inquiry into whether lawyers have a future rather than a 
prediction of their demise”.100   
 
And, equally mercifully, while prophesying that: 
  
“lawyers who are unwilling to change their working practices and 
extend their range of services, will, in the coming decade, struggle to 
survive”,101 
 
adds  
 
“dispute avoidance and online dispute resolution will chip away at 
some of this domain, but I do not see these as eliminating advocacy 
entirely”.102 
 
So I end by considering the moral issue created by the art of advocacy 
itself.103 
A recent consultation paper by a trio of legal regulators described 
Advocacy as “a fundamental pillar of the Justice system”,104 as certainly it is, 
viewed from a national perspective. Lord Hoffmann noted that: 
 
                                                     
99 R Susskind The End of Lawyers?: Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services (OUP, 
2008). 
100 Ibid p 269 n1. 
101 Above n99, p 269. 
102 Above n99, p 274. 
103 See Ridalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 236 “Advocacy is more an art than a 
science. It cannot be conducted according to formulae. Individuals differ in their style 
and approach”. Sir Thomas Bingham MR at p 236.   
See “Advocacy as Art” Michael Beloff QC, The Margaret Howard Lecture, Oxford 
2000. “Advocacy: A Craft Under Threat” Michael Beloff QC, “The First Hans 
Espeland Lecture” Oslo 2002. 
104 Joint Consultation by the SRA Ilex Professional Standards and the BSB. 
“Advocacy Standards” 2009 para 2. 
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“the substantial orality of the English system of trial and appellate 
procedure means that the judges rely heavily upon the advocates 
appearing before them for a fair presentation of the facts and adequate 
instruction in the law... 
The Court procedures of Europe and the United States, for example, 
lack the predominantly oral character of litigation in the United 
Kingdom”.105 
 
It is regarded as axiomatic that the services of a professional advocate are 
beneficial: whether of Cicero, the hero of Robert Harris’ projected trilogy, of 
William Murray, later Lord Mansfield, of whom Alexander Pope hymned: 
 
“Graced as thou art with all the power of words, 
so known, so honoured in the House of Lords”  
 
– a couplet which have required modification had the Supreme Court been 
established 300 years ago – and which was parodied by the actor Colley 
Cibber, a victim of Murray’s eloquence, in a style worthy of William 
McGonagle: 
  
“persuasion tips his tongue whene’er he talks.   
And he has chambers in the Kings Bench Walks”.    
 
Of Clarence Darrow who in the Scopes trial, proved a more doughty 
destroyer of creationism than even Richard Dawkins, and was memorably 
played by Spencer Tracy in the film Inherit The Wind, or of modern giants 
such as Sir Sidney Kentridge or the late George Carman. There is much nice 
learning on whether and when natural justice requires that barristers’ use be 
permitted or required. 106   
Indeed the principle of equality of arms, inherent in the right to a fair 
hearing guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, requires that everyone who is a party to proceedings must have a 
                                                     
105 Arthur Hall at 692 and 695. 
106 When Governors had refused a teacher accused of sexual misconduct with a pupil 
legal representation at a disciplinary hearing, Laws LJ observed that the outcome of 
the proceedings could irretrievably prejudice his ability to practice his profession and 
continued:“Within the proper confines of the evidence, a professional advocate might 
properly make a great deal of difference to the flavour and emphasis of the governors 
conclusions, and, if there were any contest as to the primary facts to that too”. 
The Governor of X School and The Queen on the Application of G and Y City Council 
[2010] EWCA Civ 1 at para 48. 
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reasonable opportunity of presenting his case to the Court under condition 
which do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis à vis his opponent.107    
But equality of arms does not mandate parity of representation. It has been 
held that a fair trial does not necessarily entail representation by a QC merely 
because the Crown is represented by one.108 
 
“The importance” said Lord Woolf “is to have an advocate, whether 
he be a barrister or solicitor, who can ensure that a defendant’s 
defence is properly and adequately placed before the Court”.109 
 
Up to a point Lord Woolf... for there are but two possibilities. Either the 
relative quality of representation has no impact on the outcome or it does.  
The first possibility is at odds with everyday experience in the Courts. In 
another context Mr Justice Megarry wisely said:  
 
“As everybody who has had anything to do with the law well knows, 
the path of the law is strewn with examples of open and shut cases 
which, somehow, were not”.110  
 
Claims in civil cases should not reach the stage of requiring adjudication 
by judge or arbitrator unless there was at least some scope for more than one 
outcome. Prosecutions would, at any rate should, not be brought or pleas of 
not guilty entered unless there is a measure of uncertainty, however, small 
about the verdict. It is precisely to alter the odds that particular advocates are 
selected. A senior silk at the top of his game is worth as much to a legal, as a 
Rooney, a Ronaldo or a Messi is to a football team. Let me call two witnesses 
from north and south of the Equator. 
 
First again, Sir Gavin Lightman who said: 
 
“A party’s performance at the trial very much turns on the investment 
made by the respective parties in the litigation: at all stages in the 
litigation money talks loud and clear. The human right to equality of 
arms has little, if any, meaning or practical effect in this context and 
                                                     
107 In AB Slovakia the ECtHR held that by proceeding in the applicant’s absence and, 
by failing, prior to that, to take a formal decision on her request for the appointment 
of a lawyer, the Bratislava Regional Court deprived the applicant of the opportunity to 
present her case under conditions of equality vis a vis a defendant.   
108 R v Lea, Shatwell & Attorney General’s Reference No 82 of 2000 [2002] EWCA 
Crim 215. 
109 Lord Woolf at para 14. 
110 John v Rees [1970] Ch 345 at 402. 
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the judge, however fair-minded and interventionist, has limited scope 
to redress the balance. A litigant purchases the quality of justice he 
can afford. The quality of solicitors and counsel varies as does the 
quality of wine from “unfit to drink” to vintage. Vintage tends to be 
very expensive beyond the means of the ordinary litigant. Most must 
be satisfied with “plonk”. A failure of advice at the first stage is 
calculated to cause irreversible harm. The prospects of success of a 
case very much turn on the quality or lack of quality of preparation for 
trial. Cases are won and lost by reason of the quality of representation 
at the trial: hence the extravagant fees paid to litigation lawyers. Tell it 
not in Gath but the scales of justice favour those who can afford to 
buy it.”111 
 
Second, if more succinctly Michael Kirby the peripatetic former 
Antipodean High Court Judge who wrote: 
 
“In an adversarial system such as exists in the UK and Australia, the 
party that argues most persuasively will often win the day.”112 
 
It is not always the case that he who pays wins: but it is certainly the case 
that whereas all barristers are equal, some are more equal than others.  
Geoffrey Robertson QC entitled his interim autobiography “The Justice 
Game”.113 Contests between unevenly matched contestants may be acceptable 
in a game, but not when justice is the intended trophy.   
It would be little consolation to the clients of Jerry Guerinot, twenty of 
whose clients have been sentenced to death in Texas, that Vanessa D. 
Gilmore, the Federal Judge in Houston, in turning down an appeal by a British 
woman, Linda Carty, convicted of murder which was grounded on Guerinot’s 
incompetence in handling of her case said without conscious irony “The 
Constitution does not require perfection in trial representation.”114 
There may be a hollow in the crown of the adversarial system but how it 
is to be filled, in the real, as distinct from the ideal world, I confess do not 
know. 
But let me not conclude on so dispiriting a note! 
 
In Metcalf v Mardell115 Lord Hobhouse said: 
                                                     
111 CJQ 238. 
112 The Hon Michael Kirby  “The common law and international law - a dynamic 
contemporary dialogue” (2010) 30 Legal Studies 55. 
113 Above n 30. 
114 New York Times, May 18th 2010. 
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“The judicial system exists to administer justice and it is integral to 
such a system that it provides within a society a means by which 
rights, obligations and liabilities can be recognised and given effect to 
in accordance with the law and disputes, justifies (and efficiently) 
resolved. The role of the independent advocate is central to achieving 
this outcome”.116 
 
So in a lecture which is inevitably decked out in borrowed plumes, I hope 
I may be forgiven for plagiarising myself with a tail feather: 
 
“They also serve who only stand and speak”.117 
 
                                                     
116 At p 149. 
117 M Beloff QC “Judicial Review 2000 – a Prophetic Odyssey” (1995) 58 MLR 143. 
